Sanctioning Israel? Germany’s persistent No in the Union

23 Jul 2026 Sanctioning Israel? Germany’s persistent No in the Union

Posted at 13:58h in CAHRA, Good practices, Human rights by Daniela Carosio

The European Union’s foreign policy toward Israel is currently defined by internal division regarding the 2000 EU-Israel Association Agreement. As more countries pass sanctions on Israel independently, the call for a united EU approach grows. An important such attempt happened In September 2025, with the EU commission proposing to suspend trade-related provisions and bilateral aid of this agreement. If this proposal would have passed, goods from Israel would have lost preferential access to EU markets, being charged the same taxes as any other third country imports. Suspending the 2000 trade agreement would have also meant cancelling EU commission bilateral support to Israel, including financial allocations for 2025-27 of (on average) 6 million a year, and institutional cooperation costing roughly 14 million over the defined timespan

German voices in April 2025, a month before the vote, had insisted on continued “constructive dialogue”, returning to the repeated argument that sanctioning the Jewish state of Israel is not in line with Germany’s historical responsibility towards the state of Israel (“Staatsräson”)^[5]. Many international and domestic observers instead mention that defending human rights and basic freedoms are Germany’s responsibility internationally, and that their conduct undermines their own long-standing foreign policy goal of peace and security for Israel, by escalating further and thus reducing security in the region ⁵. Population surveys show that Germans broadly disagree with their government; by April 2024, 61% of Germans said that Israel’s actions had gone too far ^[6].

The economic and strategic dimension of the German government’s relationship with Israel is dominated by the defence sector. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Germany provided 30 percent of Israel’s major arms imports between 01/2019 and 12/2023 ^[7], with military exports amounting to €550m in that timespan. It is noteworthy that €19.8m of these military exports took place in the last quarter of 2023, after the start of the war in Gaza ^[8]. In the following year, 2024, Germany granted arms export licenses to Israel valuing €169m, second most after France in the EU (€362m)^[9]. These included €48m of armoured vehicles, €37m of ammunition, and €13m bombs. Again, license acceptance was concentrated in the 4th quarter, after the ceasefire agreement was reached.

Major General Nadav Lotan and Lieutenant General Christian Freuding (© IDF Press Release 02/20/2026)

Through rising international legal pressure and public debate^[10], on 8 August 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced a partial arms embargo, suspending the issuance of weapons export licences to Israel for use in the Gaza Strip “until further notice”. But this suspension did not stand for long, as a few months later, Germany ended the partial suspension of arms transfers, announcing that it will “return to examining on a case-by-case basis the export of weapons”^[11]. In 11/2025 to 02/2026, following the “case-by-case” assessment, Germany granted €166.95m in arms export licenses to Israel ^[12].

Germany is not only exporting; the dependence is mutual. Currently, Germany feels increased pressure to increase their historically small defence capabilities and relies on Israel for much of the necessary technology. From August 2025 to end-of-September 2025, notably during the official break in arms exports, the German army procurement office placed orders in Israel totalling €315m¹⁰. In October 2025, Israeli media revealed a deal in which the German army planned to buy tank defence missiles designed by Israel’s largest, 100% state-owned defence company Rafael for up to €2 billion^[13]. Missiles were projected to be produced mainly in Germany by the consortium EuroSpike, a joint venture between Rafael (20%), Rheinmetall (40%) and Diehl (40%). EuroSpike was founded in 2004, with the goal to promote Israeli anti-tank missiles in Europe. Their website today interestingly does not mention Israel ^[14].

The big German defence industry players such as KNDS (Munich), the Diehl-Group (Nuremberg), Airbus (Munich) and Rheinmetall (Dusseldorf) participate in partnership projects similar to EuroSpike with Israeli private and state-owned defence companies to develop rocket launchers, armour for tanks, rockets, and the Heron Drone to be used in Frontex Operations in the mediterranean^[15]. As the Heron Drone example shows, these technologies are partly bought by Germany but partly will be used by or in other EU countries. The German defence industry’s growth is supported by a shifting geopolitical environment of war in Ukraine and wavering US support in which Europe as a whole, as well as its individual members, feel increased pressure to ramp up defence capabilities ^[16]. Additionally, defence industry players are expected to gain- for reference, the stock price of Rheinmetall, Germany’s biggest defence company, rose from €59 in 2020 to €1.700 in June 2025^[17]. Investors see that there is money to be made, as in Q1 2025, Rheinmetall had orders for €63 billion, compared to €24m in 2022 (before the beginning of the war in Ukraine).

Many key defence players are operating from Bavaria- governed by the CSU, the more conservative cousin of the CDU, and its “Ministerpräsident” Markus Söder. He is known for advocating for “no limits” on defence exports and champions the defence industry as a pillar of the county’s economy ^[18]. A discussion about making arms exports easier in Bavaria’s “Landtag” saw the “Freie Wähler” and the CDU/CSU on the yes and the Greens and the SPD on the defence position^[19]. While it is surely economically opportune for Bavaria, and in line with national security concerns, there are also speculations of private interests at the table. There are allegations of large sums paid by arms lobbyists to the head of the CSU party and “Ministerpräsident” of the time in 1991 ^[20], and also the current CDU-led national government has ties to lobbying groups, with the Chancellor Friedrich Merz himself, prior to becoming chancellor, having been vice-president of the CDU-Wirtschaftsrat[21], where industry lobbyists including of Rheinmetall gain access to politicians^[22]. The Israeli newspaper “Haaretz” confirmed that its defence industry is not worried about their future business in Europe- citing company representatives (“Unternehmensvertreter”)^[23].

On 11/2025, the UN special rapporteur for development came to Germany for the first time to report. The press release voiced concern that Germany is reducing its Official Development Assistance (ODA) as well as funding for social welfare, while increasing its defence budget. The resulting press release warned that “Without offering a foolproof guarantee of peace and security, the German Government’s current approach is likely to trigger an arms race and encourage corporate profiting from a war economy” ^[24]. The press release specifically cautions the government not to cave to business interests above human rights concerns: “The Government must avoid ‘caving’ to business lobbying to dilute human rights due diligence regulations and instead should promote respect for human rights and the environment as a precondition of doing business. “ ^[25]

Since the failed 2025 proposal, Germany continues to block unified European Union sanctions against Israel, citing its historical responsibility as a justification for maintaining the bilateral trade agreement despite significant domestic public opposition. This political stance is reinforced by a deep-seated mutual defence dependency, characterized by Germany providing 30% of Israel’s major arms imports while increasingly relying on Israeli innovations, such as anti-tank missile systems, for its own growing military needs. While the government briefly paused weapons licenses in 2025 due to international pressure, it rapidly resumed significant exports under a “case-by-case” framework since. Consequently, Germany’s policy reflects a prioritisation of strategic industrial partnerships and the profits of major defence firms over human rights concerns, which international observers warn could encourage a permanent war economy.

^[1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2112

^[2] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2026/05/eu-israel-trade-agreement/

^[3] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/21/spain-slovenia-ireland-push-eu-to-debate-israel-pact-
suspension

^[4] https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/israel/2025/09/israel-250917-european-
commission01.htm

^[5] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5390330

^[6] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5390330

^[7] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/17/germany-lifts-curbs-on-arms-exports-to-israel-citing-
gaza-ceasefire

^[8] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5390330

^[9] https://euobserver.com/214004/france-topped-eu-arms-sales-to-israel-while-backing-mini-sanctions/

^[10] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5390330

^[11] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/11/germany-arms-transfers-to-israel-reckless-unlawful
-and-risks-complicity-in-israels-international-crimes/

^[12] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-germany-has-okayed-7-8m-in-arms-exports-to-
israel-in-iran-war-below-earlier-deals/