Policing Solidarity - Sustainable Value Investors

16 Jul 2026 Policing Solidarity

Posted at 23:22h in Human rights, Publications by Daniela Carosio

Legal responses to pro-Palestine protest in Germany

In December 2023, in a joint letter to the EU Council, several relevant European NGOs that work to protect, empower and defend civil society, civil space and human rights in Europe expressed concerns over restrictions on peaceful assembly and expression, in particular against people and organisations voicing solidarity with the Palestinian people. In this section, we examine the case of Germany’s legal response to Pro-Palestinian Activism.

Germany’s current handling of pro-Palestine activism is shaped by a complex interplay of historical obligations and new national security priorities. In recent years, the state has adopted a more assertive legal stance, leading to increased regulation of public symbols and protest slogans, ultimately trickling down to affect executive handling of pro-Palestine action. This evolving landscape reflects a significant shift in how German authorities perceive the relationship between international solidarity movements and domestic security politics.

Palestine was never officially recognised as a state, so in Germany there is no official governmental position towards Palestine^[1]. Instead, Germany defines the safety of the state of Israel as paramount, mostly because of its historical responsibility for the holocaust. Germany advocates a two-state solution through peaceful negotiations with the goal of an independent, liveable state of Palestine existing safely at the side of a state of Israel. In June of 2026, the party Die Linke recognised the actions of Israel in Gaza as a genocide^[2], a step that the German government has not taken, in contrast to some EU partners. Within German politics, Die Linke remains only parliamentary party to acknowledge the events in Gaza as a genocide. The statement from their party summit drew widespread criticism, even though in the same speech, they reaffirmed Israel’s right to a state while advocating a two-state solution^[3].

Following the Hamas Attack in Israel on October 7th, 2023, German chancellor Olaf Scholz stated Israel had “every right to defend themselves”, and that “Germany stands at the side of Israel”^[4], followed by an immediate crackdown on pro-Palestine solidarity action of all kinds, strongest in Berlin. Police in Berlin were prohibiting demonstrations^[5], which partly took place anyways, accompanied by police operatives using tear gas and water cannons, arresting 194 in the night of October 19th, 2023, in Neukölln alone^[6]. Politicians from almost all parties including SPD, Grüne, and CDU criticised the protest as antisemitic. The discourse then shifted specifically to pro-Palestine actions in public schools in Berlin, as the police in Berlin wrote a letter to deans allowing a prohibition of the keffiyeh, seen as a terrorist symbol, in schools. Other prohibited items include any other action or message that approves Hamas’ attack on Israel, such as stickers saying, “free Palestine”, saying “free Palestine” out loud, brandishing a map of Israel in the colours of the Palestinian flag, among others. The decision was reasoned with these symbols “endangering the school peace”. Enforcement depended on the responsible deans.

Individual counties also took a stance: The Berlin prosecutor’s office determined the slogan “From the River to the Sea” amounts to incitement to hatred (“Volksverhetzung”) under Paragraph 130 of German law, on the grounds that anyone laying claim to the whole area from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean negates Israel’s right to existence. Bavaria separately declared in November 2023 that using the phrase, regardless of language, would be treated as use of a terrorist organization’s symbol, carrying a sentence of up to three years in prison^[7].

A similar assortment of symbols was declared illegal under the “Prohibition of Activity for the Terror Organisation Hamas” (“Betätigungsverbots für die Terrororganisation Hamas “,) voiced by the minister for the Interior, Nancy Faeser (SPD) in fall 2023^[8], which included the red triangle, depictions of Hamas leaders, and the slogan “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free”. It is important to note that this list is non-exhaustive- depending on context, also other symbols or slogans can be considered illegal. How this is prosecuted, meaning whether there is a consequence such as a fine for having said the slogan “From the River to the Sea” depends a lot on the jurisdiction. Many judges do not pass guilty verdicts^[9], others do^[10]. In either case, the main application of the legislation on slogans is as a reason for arrests, search operations in private apartments^[11], and confiscating electronic devices, and that has an effect on its own. It is clear through these legal changes treating pro-Palestine activity as “terrorist” that pro-Palestine activists are perceived as a threat.

In April 2024, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, also known as Domestic Intelligence Service (“Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz”)^[12], published an article titled “Zwischen Fluss, Meer und Strafbefehl” which translates to “Between river, sea, and summary penalty order” explaining the connection between solidarity with Palestine and dogmatic left-wing extremism ^[13]. The article starts by arguing that for dogmatic left extremists, solidarity with Palestine is a key field of action and unity, as left-wing extremists aim to radicalise protestors and gain new members, abusing humanitarian and democratic processes and provoking violence and division, all to the goal of pushing the dogma of their ideology^[14]. However, these movements have very different positions from each other, and many tend to strive for goals that align with the government’s foreign policy pushing for a two-state-solution. For instance, the Marxist-Leninist party of Germany (MLPD) declared Hamas fascists and antisemites, the socialist German workers youth (SDAJ) advocates for a two-state solution, whereas the Communist Organisation (KO) denies Israel’s right to a state.

The phrase “From the River to the Sea” predates Hamas existence and throughout the political history of the region, has been used for both the Israeli and the Palestinian claim to statehood. Through this complex history, the call has gained two opposing meanings- supporters frame it as a call for Palestinians to live freely in the land from the river to the sea^[15], yet the Israeli right has continued to employ the same language to argue for a Jewish state reaching from the river Jordan to the Mediterranean. There is a notable difference in international reaction depending on the speaker: while the phrase is illegalised in Germany and protestors’ rights are violated for uttering it, the structurally identical claim made by Israeli officials including the Prime Minister drew no comparable institutional consequence. The global context shows a variety of governmental stances towards the slogan “From the River to the Sea”, ranging from enforceable bans in Queensland, Australia to proposals for legislation and individual sanctioning actions not constituting a real ban in places such as France and the Czech Republic.

Language and its meaning continue to dominate the landscape of legal reaction to Palestine solidarity expression in Germany. In 2024, the Bundestag passed a non-binding but highly debated resolution mandating that organizations receiving state funding must subscribe to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)[16] definition of antisemitism and must not participate in boycotts of Israel^[17]. It received criticism from free-speech advocates and progressive groups who contend the definition is overly broad and chills legitimate political expression. The BDS movement spoke against it, as it heavily restricts funding for all organisations supporting Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel. Even the definition’s chief author Kenneth Stern has cautioned against its weaponisation, warning that it was “never intended to be used by governments and others the way it has been” ^[18]. Also in the US, the definition of what constitutes antisemitism has been updated, with the Antisemitism Awareness Act passed in the House of Representatives in May 2024. It would have mandated the Department of Education to use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism when investigating discrimination complaints on college campuses^[19]. Failing to pass the senate in 2024, it succeeded to pass both chambers in 2025, entering into force^[20]. Internationally, 35 countries have adopted the IHRA’s non-binding holocaust definition, including all 27 EU countries, according to their website^[21].

While the German government maintains a diplomatic commitment to a two-state solution, it has implemented significant restrictions on pro-Palestine symbols and slogans that are increasingly framed by state authorities as extremist threats. These measures, ranging from school-level bans on the keffiyeh in Berlin to arrests and police searches of apartments and devices for the use of specific slogans, have created a notable chilling effect on public discourse despite a lack of judicial consensus regarding the legality of such speech. Ultimately, the tension between state security narratives and domestic activism continues to shape a landscape where pro-Palestine solidarity expression is closely monitored and often criminalised. Bigger concerns regard questions of rule of law in the country, as the German government’s criminalisation of specifically pro-Palestinian activism is in contradiction with constitutional rights to free speech and global humanitarian law. Crumbling foundational rights are a strong warning signal and can shake trust in the legal processes and lawfulness in Germany as a whole.

Germany between freedom of speech and intruding rule of law through state enforcement

The UN special rapporteur for freedom of opinion visited Germany in January 2026 and warned that the government, while taking threats to freedom of speech seriously, has relied increasingly on criminalisation and security-oriented approaches to address them, and cautioned that many of these measures are “inconsistent with international human rights standards” ^[22]

Compared to the last few years, most experts speak of increased violence from the side of the police in Germany in pro-Palestine protests. This is partly reasoned with political tolerance of such conduct stoked by the incendiary declarations on the terrorist and antisemitic nature of pro-Palestinian protest voiced by members of the CDU-led senate^[23] ^[24] ^[25]. Examples of such increased violence are policemen punching people in the face^[26], pushing people to the ground^[27] and detaining them at protests. “Schmerzgriffe”, translating to “pain holds” are also used in police actions, such as grabbing protestors in the face and pulling up the nose bone so that it causes great pain. Witnesses report these pain holds being used indiscriminately, also on elderly citizens and minors, despite being judged excessive by most criminology and legal experts. Recent court rulings also stated that these pain holds cannot be used on climate activists because it is unreasonable, excessive use of force. It might be argued that pro-Palestinian protestors should fall under a similar category. There are also more general shifts in the overall composure of German police at pro-Palestine protests: according to reports, officers arrive at a peaceful scene with sleeves rolled up, jaws tight, shouting and wearing reinforced gloves for pushing anything and anyone who seems to be in their way^[28].

Over time, police conduct changed beyond Palestine-solidarity protests: As the slogan “From the River to the Sea” was declared illegal in 2023, any public assembly where it was stated could be targeted. Similar police violence to the one reported from pro-Palestine protests, legally approved by the “terrorist” nature of “anti-Israel” messaging, was also present in the 8th of March demonstrations for the International Feminist Day of Action, where some protestors expressed solidarity with Palestine. The arbitrary nature of the legislation illegalising certain slogans such as “From the River to the Sea” became painstakingly visible in a demonstration taking place outside a courthouse in Berlin in August 2025. Inside, one activist was judged not guilty for saying the slogan, all the while police outside were undertaking arrests on reasons of the same slogan being used^[29]. Also, the CSD (the Internationalist Queer Pride Parade) in July 2025 in Berlin suffered from police pushback: the police violently ended the protest which had a public Palestinian solidarity angle^[30].

Online, numerous non-congruent reports of police action at protests from both sides, police and protesters, are circulating- in some cases, more video footage and analysis help identify reality later, but often the correction to the original story is lost to the media maelstrom. In one prominent example of diverging narratives, police stated that protestors had pulled a policeman into the crowd and trampled on him on the floor, seriously injuring him and breaking his wrist- the footage analysis shows otherwise. On this day, cases were opened against over 90 individuals protesting, yet no investigation was opened concerning the officer’s behaviour^[31]. On 16th October 2025, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) urged Germany to halt “criminalisation and police violence against Palestinian solidarity activism”^[32]^[33], and in January 2026, the UN special rapporteur of freedom of opinion stated in a report following a visit to Germany that “Pro-Palestinian activism, academic and artistic freedom are unduly restricted in Germany”^[34].

Feminised and sexualised violence by the police is also increasingly brought up by victims and witnesses when discussing pro-Palestine protests in Germany. Multiple reports and videos are circulating online of police officers appearing to be using protests as a reason for grabbing breasts, pulling hair, and hitting the chest of female protesters, or pushing them to the floor with undue violence. Especially many such reports came out after the 8th of March 2025 demonstration against violence against women^[35]. After a video showing a policeman hitting a women protestor in the face in a pro-Palestinian protest in August 2025, the Irish ambassador to Germany her voiced concern^[36]. Another example of specifically feminised violence occurred in September 2025 at a protest in Berlin, when police arrested a female protester, then told her to take off her t-shirt in the middle of the street. The video shows how she refuses, and the police responds with threats of force^[37]. The woman is a lawyer and human rights activist from Turkey, who held a speech at the protest. Video footage also shows German police using “Schmerzensgriffe” on a girl protesting (who is reported to be 14 years old at the time), a policeman twisting her wrist and covering her face with his hand, pulling her head back and painfully pulling the nose bone upwards. Context analysis confirmed that this tactic was out of proportion and not necessary^[38]. This specific case has been fact-checked by Correctiv, but it is only one of many such videos circulating online showing police violently treating protestors. There is a lack of follow-up and factchecking on most of them, but their sheer volume makes it unlikely that they are all taken out of context.

Often not made a topic in the text itself of newspaper clippings, but visible in many of the pictures from demonstrations in connection with police violence, are non-white people.

There is very little news coverage on racialised violence in conjunction with pro-Palestine protests, but there are some reports of racist violence as part of, or following pro-Palestine demonstrations, such as a protestor being hit and arrested by police on the way home from a protest^[39]. More broadly, the German police is known for internal issues with Nazism and right-wing extremism^[40], which translates in being known for being racist, in general. The political stance towards Palestine solidarity protests as anti-Israel and terrorist outwardly legitimises this violent behaviour (which already is internally tolerated). The understanding that racial violence in the police is structural also reflects in the racial profiling statistic: the share of persons controlled by the police in 2025-26 that were perceived as foreigners is 2x the share of persons not perceived as foreigners^[41]. Muslims were hit worst in the statistics of police controls, so it stands to be expected that anti-Muslimism sentiment also plays a role in other police actions, such as police violence in reaction to pro-Palestine protests.

In addition to a changing, more violent and more restricted reality on the streets, legislative changes show the German government taking a different stance towards tackling social challenges: instead of dialogue, they put their hopes in increased policing^[42]. Social spending has seen big cuts in recent years (i.e. for cleaning of public spaces, education, and infrastructure), while simultaneously, policing has increased in areas that are considered “social problem hotspots”. One such example is the appearance of mobile police stations in areas perceived risk areas, and requirements for showing ID at the public pools in Berlin^[43]. Policing generally increased through the Police Reform 2025 (“Polizeireform 2025”), including increased liberty for the police regarding preventive digital surveillance of encoded messages, controls without reasonable suspicion in specific zones such as train stations (Germany-wide) and more^[44].

In terms of protest culture and civil organising, the legislative and executive restrictions on Palestine solidarity action in Germany should be seen as part of a bigger move to criminalise peaceful protest and civil disobedience in the last decade, visible in the history of climate action protest^[45]. In the beginning, the Fridays for Future strikes were rarely prosecuted once they were broken up- that changed later as it became common to record IDs and open “coercion” proceedings under paragraph 240 of the Criminal Code^[46]. In October 2022, reports increased of excessive use of force by Police, and mainly in Bavaria, preventive detention without charges started being imposed on climate activists ^[47]. Starting late 2022, “Last Generation” (“Letzte Generation”) members have been investigated in Bavaria, Flensburg and Neuruppin (Brandenburg) under paragraph 129 for forming or participating in a criminal organisation, defined as a structured group of more than two people, lasting over time, directed at offences carrying over two years’ imprisonment ^[48]. This criminal organisation charge allowed for a much wider reach in the investigation, such as raiding homes, freezing bank accounts, and surveilling communication^[49].

The recent case of the “Ulm 5” is a striking illustration that paragraph 129 has become a general-purpose tool for German prosecutors against organised direct-action protest. This time, charges of aggravated property damage, trespassing, and membership in a criminal organization which can carry sentences of up to 5 years in prison are levelled not against climate activists, but involve five “Palestine Action”–affiliated activists who broke into an Elbit Systems (a large Israeli arms manufacturer) facility in Ulm in September 2025. The trial opened in April 2026 at Stuttgart’s high-security Stammheim prison complex, the same site as the 1970s Red Army Faction trials, which defendants argue furthers the impression their clients are “dangerous individuals” ^[50].

The Palestine protests and the legislative and executive reactions (banned slogans, cancelled protests, detentions, searches and confiscations, and violence against protestors) take place as part of this larger development of increased policing in reaction to organised protest action. As the UN special rapporteur’s warning from January 2026 cautioned, many of these measures are “inconsistent with international human rights standards” ^[51]. This is concerning, not only for Germany’s role model aspirations regarding Human Rights and political freedom, but also for the solidity of rule of law. Infringing on constitutional rights such as freedom of opinion, and criminalising peaceful protest and civil disobedience to this extent opens concerns into the effectiveness of rule of law more broadly- increasing erratic treatment of Human Rights increases risk for all parties participating in public life in Germany.

Criminalising Dissent from Climate Action to Palestine Protest

In terms of protest culture and civil organising in Germany, the recent legislative and executive restrictions on Palestine solidarity action alongside reports of increasing police violence should be seen as part of a bigger move to criminalise peaceful protest and civil disobedience in the last decade, visible in the history of the last big civil movement, the climate action protests.

Fridays for Future (FFF), inspired by Greta Thunberg’s school strikes, mobilised up to 1.4 million people in Germany at its 2019 peak^[52]. These largely peaceful school strikes were essentially tolerated by police. Also in 2019, Extinction Rebellion (XR) started staging sit-in blockades ^[53]. In the beginning, these were rarely prosecuted once they were broken up- that changed later as it became common to record IDs and open “coercion” proceedings under paragraph 240 of the Criminal Code^[54].

In August 2021, the “Last Generation” (“Letzte Generation”) was founded by several former FFF and XR activists, who were frustrated that the older movements weren’t shifting government policy ^[55]. Their first action was a hunger strike by seven activists demanding climate talks with the candidates to succeed Angela Merkel as chancellor. From January 2022 they escalated to continuous road blockades (gluing themselves to streets), later adding museum actions (the mashed-potato-on-Monet protest in Potsdam), oil pipeline valve shutoffs at the PCK refinery in Schwedt, and airport runway blockades ^[56]. The policy response escalated in step with the movement’s evolution: during 2019-22, legal responses were mostly limited to fines and “coercion” charges for blockades, traffic disruption, trespassing, and property damage. This changed towards October 2022, when reports increased of excessive use of force by the police, and mainly in Bavaria, preventive detention without charges started being imposed on activists ^[57]. No other state allowed detention for as long as Bavaria (up to 2 months), which was extended further in September 2023 (before returning to the 2 months rule), and other counties followed suit, with Berlin and North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) extending their preventive detention times too ^[58].

From late 2022, Last Generation members have been investigated in Bavaria, Flensburg and Neuruppin (Brandenburg) for forming or participating in a criminal organisation, defined as a structured group of more than two people, lasting over time, directed at offences carrying over two years’ imprisonment ^[59]. These “criminal organisation” investigations under paragraph 129 of the Criminal Code are now also levelled on pro-Palestinian activists of the “Ulm 5”^[60]. This criminal organisation charge allowed for a much wider reach in the investigation, such as raiding homes, freezing bank accounts, and surveilling communication. In a single coordinated action in May 2023 relating to climate activism, 170 police officers raided fifteen properties nationwide, seizing evidence and freezing assets^[61].

2024 saw the latest escalation stage against climate activists, as in July 2024, Berlin’s Tiergarten court sentenced a leading Last Generation organiser, Miriam M., to one year and four months in prison without parole, for resisting law enforcement, property damage, and coercion (coercion here meaning recruiting others to similar actions)^[62]. Paragraph 129 charges of forming a criminal organisation are also levelled against 5 other Last Generation members- as of now, the trial is underway. UN Special Rapporteur Mary Lawlor wrote to the German government in December 2024 over the case and said publicly in early 2026 that Section 129 was being “misused to sanction nonviolent acts motivated by wholly legitimate concerns about climate change and human rights” ^[63]. This publicly addresses what in the national debate seems out of focus- the increasing erosion of rule of Law in Germany, heightening risk for all players- personally as well as professionally, a predictable, internally congruent legal system is the foundation for a stable, safe existence.

The most recent case of the “Ulm 5” is a striking illustration that paragraph 129 has become a general-purpose tool for German prosecutors against organised direct-action protest. This time, charges of aggravated property damage, trespassing, and membership in a criminal organization which can carry sentences of up to 5 years in prison are leveled not against climate activists, but involve five Palestine Action–affiliated activists who broke into an Elbit Systems (Israeli arms manufacturer) facility in Ulm in September 2025. The trial opened in April 2026 at Stuttgart’s high-security Stammheim prison complex, the same site as the 1970s Red Army Faction trials, which defendants argue furthers the impression their clients are “dangerous individuals” ^[64].

The Palestine protests and the legislative and executive reactions (banned slogans, cancelled protests, detentions, searches and confiscations, and violence against protestors) take place as part of this larger development of increased policing in reaction to organised protest action, visible in the trajectory of the climate protest movement. The UN special rapporteur for freedom of opinion visited Germany in January 2026 and warned that the government, while taking threats to freedom of speech seriously, has relied increasingly on criminalisation and security-oriented approaches to address them, and cautioned that many of these measures are “inconsistent with international human rights standards” ^[65], pointing to the worrisome disconnect between constitutional and international human rights and current political and legal decisions criminalising and persecuting reasonable activism and civil disobedience.

Legal responses to pro-Palestine protest in the UK

In December 2023, in a joint letter to the EU Council, several relevant European NGOs that work to protect, empower and defend civil society, civil space and human rights in Europe expressed concerns over restrictions on peaceful assembly and expression, against people and organisations voicing solidarity with the Palestinian people^[66]. In this section, we examine the case of the United Kingdom’s legal response to Pro-Palestinian Activism.

The UK, while not restricting the slogan ”From the River to the Sea” itself, is actually one of the most aggressive examples of state action against the Palestine solidarity movement, touching counter-terrorism law, protest policing, immigration enforcement, and university surveillance activity.

In July 2025, then-Home Office Secretary Yvette Cooper (representing the Interior ministry) proscribed Palestine Action UK under the Terrorism Act 2000, after activists broke into the Royal Air Force Base Brize Norton in South England and spray-painted two military aircrafts. This put the group on par with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, making membership a crime carrying a sentence of up to 14 years in prison ^[67]. The practical implications have been enormous: since the ban took effect, over two thousand people have been arrested under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act simply for holding signs reading “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action,” and by mid-2026 that figure had passed 3,000, with arrestees including students, teachers, pensioners, and even an 83-year-old retired vicar ^[68]. This proscription has seen a dramatic legal back-and-forth, starting in February 2026, as the High Court ruled it unlawful, finding that the ban breached rights to freedom of expression and assembly under the European Convention on Human Rights, but keeping the ban in place temporarily to allow the government to appeal the decision ^[69]. A few months later, in June 2026, the Court of Appeal overturned the first ruling, finding the proscription lawful and proportionate, with the court holding that Palestine Action’s campaign was intended to close down lawful businesses ^[70].

The “Filton 24” case marked the first time in British legal history that protesters were sentenced as terrorists for property damage. “Filton 24” is the term applied to the activists involved in the 2024 Elbit Systems factory action, in which they dismantled and destroyed military drones and equipment at an Elbit Systems research facility in Filton, near Bristol, in August 2024. The activists were initially denied bail and were held in prison for up to 18 months, and in June 2026, four were sentenced to a combined 20+ years. There are three other trials scheduled for the other 19 actionists ending in 2027^[71].

Elbit system vice president and IDF reservist major General Miki Edelstein was a presenter at a land warfare conference taking place in the first week of July 2026, organised by the Royal United Services Institute, where he shared concerning numbers on Elbit System’s products’ application in Gaza, generating public concern regarding the overt nature of these statements pointing to complicity in causing serious civilian harm in the presence of top UK military personnel. Elbit system supplies the IDF with a command system called Tzayad, or Hunter, that maps friendly and enemy positions. The Elbit speaker at the conference cited that between 7th October 2023 and the end of 2025, 850.000 targets had been identified across all Israeli “theatres of war”, the principal one being Gaza, through the Hunter command system. Elbit says there is a human in the loop who verifies target information and takes the final decision, but experts have voiced doubt over the feasibility of thoroughly verifying these many targets daily, without the help of Artificial Intelligence. This concern resonates strongly in public opinion considering the international criticism over very high civilian casualty numbers in all theatres of war since the 3rd of October by Israel^[72].

The British public is reacting with outrage to the government’s implicit support of Elbit system’s continued activity in the UK, demanding legal challenges against activists who were involved in the Elbit factory action to be dropped. Emotions are especially heightened as Andy Burnham (Labour), widely seen as prime minister-in-waiting, had assured that the UK government had suspended all arms exports to Israel. Later it was revealed that only 35 out of 350 export licenses had been withdrawn. In a video message from 10.07.2026, Burnham apologises for his party’s Gaza policy but refrains from using terms such as war crimes or genocide, the official admittance of which would impose legal obligations on the country to act^[73].

Back at home, the UK government enacted tighter restrictions on Palestine solidarity marches. Police have used Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to impose restricted routes, timings, and exclusion zones on every national march for Palestine held in London since October 2023, with the Met Police commissioner stating they had used these conditions (routes, timings, exclusion zones) on protests more than ever before. The justification often cited is a claimed disruption to nearby synagogues, even though organisers note that none of the march routes have directly passed a synagogue and that there has been no reported incident of an actual threat to a place of worship linked to the marches ^[74]. The two senior organisers Ben Jamal (Palestine Solidarity Campaign) and Chris Nineham (Stop the War Coalition) were convicted in April 2026 for breaching protest conditions (organising a protest passing close to a synagogue) and inciting others to breach those imposed conditions, showing the consequences of tightening Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act spreading beyond the protest day itself ^[75].

A new Crime and Policing Bill from April 2026 takes this further still, adding a clause letting police prohibit protests near places of worship and a “cumulative disruption” power in clause 165 that could restrict repeat demonstrations on the same theme. Critics warn that this seriously restricts free speech and is explicitly framed around the Palestine marches ^[76], even though, as the bill’s opponents point out, the powers could be turned on any recurring protest movement, not just Palestine-related ones ^[77].

Immigration and visa politics are also used in the UK against Palestine solidarity activists, as in 2024, the Home Office has used its power to revoke visas on “not conducive to the public good” grounds against international students for pro-Palestine activism. A Palestinian law student at Manchester had her visa revoked after a campus protest (she later won the Human Rights appeal in her case) ^[78], and in 2026, an Egyptian student at King’s College London faced suspension and visa cancellation (with deportation risk to a country where he says he was previously tortured) after participating in pro-Palestine campus organising ^[79].

Immigration politics, public order disturbance orders and protest laws clash on campuses in the UK, with the university administrations often aiding authorities in denouncing students or voicing their own suspensions and campus bans. A February 2025 investigation by Liberty Investigates found at least 28 UK universities had launched disciplinary probes into 80–113 students and staff for pro-Palestinian activism since October 2023, often in collaboration with private security firms and police, including sharing of student social media accounts with police and protest intelligence ^[80]. A 2026 joint report by Al-Jazeera and Liberty Investigates found that 12 UK universities paid a private intelligence firm, Horus Security Consultancy, approximately £440,000 to monitor social media accounts and profile pro-Palestinian students and academics ^[81]. Universities such as Nottingham and Birmingham have also obtained court injunctions to evict pro-Palestine campus encampments ^[82], and some have invoked the IHRA antisemitism definition and the “Prevent counter-terrorism duty” in disciplinary proceedings against students and staff, both contested as conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism or extremism ^[83]. This creates a climate in which academics report self-censoring Palestine-related research to avoid investigations- surveys show over 75% of UK staff feel free speech has declined in the past decade, exacerbated by Gaza debates^[84].

Human Rights groups such as Liberty^[85] and Amnesty International^[86] as well as a 2026 academic monitoring report^[87] describe the current situation in the UK as a sustained, multi-front escalation rather than one law changing. This effort is spanning terrorism legislation, ordinary protest policing law, immigration powers, and university governance, and it remains actively contested in the courts as of this month. Resistance comes in the form of a claim filed on Thursday, 9th July 2026 by the European Legal Support Centre (ELSC) against the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), for the government’s implication in the resignation of a charity trustee over accusations of antisemitism for her pro-Palestinian online comments. Bea Foster, a Christian preacher and founder of the charity Building Bridges Burnley (BBB), an interfaith anti-racist organisation working to foster community cohesion and dialogue, received criticism when her posts were assessed against the IHRC’s holocaust definition criteria. Campaigners claim that the government threatened to revoke BBB’s prestigious King’s Award for Voluntary Service, demanding Bea Foster’s resignation and three-year absence from the charity’s activities. ELSC’s claim “asks the court to declare that the government’s actions were unlawful, arguing they violated Foster’s rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association and protection from discrimination”^[88].

Public opinion in the UK is shifting, exerting growing pressure on the government to change stance: A recent YouGov opinion poll commissioned by Caabu^[89] found that only 17% of respondents believed Israel is not committing genocide in Gaza, a third said they didn’t know, and 50 percent of the British public believe Israel is committing genocide^[90]. Pressure grows from legal challenges to unjust rulings on Pro-Palestinian solidarity and discontent rises regarding the government’s permissive stance towards military exports to Israel. Like the German context with mirroring adoption of the IHRA holocaust definition criteria and criminal organisation charges used to prosecute Palestine solidarity expression, this constitutes an incongruency between International Human Rights Law and domestic proceedings, calling into question if the rule of law is functioning as intended. This development should worry all parties interested in the persistence of consistent and reliable legal frameworks.

^[1] https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/nahermittlererosten/203626-203626

^[2] https://www.zeit.de/politik/2026-06/die-linke-gaza-voelkermord-nachrichtenpodcast

^[3] https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/linke-parteitag-gazakrieg-voelkermord-100.html

^[4] https://taz.de/Scholz-im-Bundestag-zu-Hamas-Angriff/!5966127/

^[5] https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2023-10/demonstration-palaestina-berlin-polizei-verbot

^[6] https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/174-festnahmen-und-stundenlange-ausschreitungen-bei-berliner
-palastina-demo-10649041.html

^[7] https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article248478522/Innenministerium-verbietet-antisemtische
-Parole-From-the-River-to-the-Sea.html

^[8] https://www.rnd.de/politik/rotes-hamas-dreieck-innenministerium-erweitert-verbot-um-neue-
kennzeichen-SUL22WJHGFDB5BAHRJ4NDQXOAQ.html

^[9] https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1192973.gaza-krieg-berlinerin-yasemin-a-freispruch-fuer-from-the-
river-to-the-sea.html

^[10] https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2024/08/urteil-berlin-from-the-river-to-the-sea.html

^[11] https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1195816.palaestina-solidaritaet-gewalt-auf-der-nakba-demo-die-
wahrheit-der-berliner-polizei.html

^[12] Its main job is to collect and analyse information about efforts that threaten the free democratic basic order and security in Germany, acting as an early warning system

https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/EN/home/home_node.html

^[13] https://verfassungsblog.de/zwischen-fluss-meer-und-strafbefehl/

^[14] https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/hintergruende/DE/linksextremismus/palaestina-
solidaritaet-im-dogmatischen-linksextremismus.html

^[15] https://jewishcurrents.org/what-does-from-the-river-to-the-sea-really-mean

[16] https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism

^[17] https://www.dw.com/en/germany-passes-controversial-antisemitism-resolution/a-70715643

^[18] https://imeu.org/resources/key-issues/explainer-the-ihra-working-definition-of-anti-semitism/221

^[19] https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/4127?__cf_chl_f_tk=iErbUcs_nVr_
n9F9BVNS1cBzcExDXhvijhtRwVZ6unE-1782816916-1.0.1.1-L187AlfrDbWAjGlXoXOXkGKGdjQX95_nZPaUqMBXYOA

^[20] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1007

^[21] https://holocaustremembrance.com/who-we-are/member-countries

^[22] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/germany-un-expert-warns-space-freedom-
expression-shrinking-amidst-growing

^[23] https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/berlin-demonstrationen-gazastreifen-palaestina-polizeigewalt-li.3273957